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Abstract
This paper develops a calibrated model that explains the pronounced counter-cyclical leverage patterns
observed for firms that access public capital markets, and relates these patters to debt and equity issues.
Moreover, it explains why leverage and debt issues do not exhibit this pronounced behavior for firms that
face more severe constraints when accessing capital markets. In the model, managers issue a combination of
debt and equity to finance investment by weighing the trade-off between agency problems and risk sharing.
During contractions, leveraged managers receive a relatively small share of wealth, resulting in a relative
increase in household demand for securities. Securities markets clear as managers that are not up against
their borrowing constraints increase leverage while satisfying the agency condition that they maintain a
large enough portion of their firm’s equity.
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Whether measured in levels or flows, there is substantial time variation in the debt-equity fi-
nancing choice that differs with the degree of capital market access. In general, firms that exhibit
low degrees of financial constraints have pronounced counter-cyclical leverage with much of the vari-
ation attributed to varying macroeconomic conditions. It is also well documented that debt issues
are counter-cyclical and equity issues are pro-cyclical for firms that access public capital markets.
Meanwhile, firms that exhibit higher degrees of financial constraints do not exhibit these pronounced
counter-cyclical leverage or debt issue patterns.1 These observations suggest that financing choices
vary systematically with macroeconomic conditions, and this response differs with the degree of
capital market access. It is natural to ask why such patterns are observed, and what are their
implications for investment and growth. In this paper, a model is developed where the fundamental
reasons for these patterns are agency problems whose severity is determined by the distribution of
aggregate wealth, which varies endogenously over the cycle. The model predicts that target debt
ratios will be relatively high when corporate profits are low or following poor performance in the
equity market for firms that are not constrained from increasing leverage. For reasonable parame-
ter values, managers adjust their capital structure and issue securities in patterns similar to those
observed in the data.
The link between access to capital markets, investment and the macroeconomy has traditionally
1Specifically, Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) document that seasoned primary equity issues are pro-cyclical and
debt issues are counter-cyclical. Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald (1990) document that equity issues are positively
related with equity market performance. Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) document that debt (public and private)
increases for large firms but remains flat for small firms following recessions associated with a monetary contraction.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) document that net short term debt issues are flatter over the business cycle for small
firms. After correcting for time-variation in firm characteristics, Korajczyk and Levy (2000) document that: (1)
macroeconomic conditions account for a substantial portion of the observed counter-cyclical leverage patterns for firms
that they classify as financially unconstrained, (2) their constrained sample does not exhibit counter-cyclical leverage
patterns, (3) deviations from estimated target leverage is economically and statistically significant in explaining time
series variations in issue choice for both samples.
2been analyzed in the credit channel literature.2 This literature generally focuses on firms that
rely on debt financing and face severe agency problems in accessing external capital.3 It explains
how agency problems in accessing external capital at the firm level result in exaggerated swings in
economic activity as feedback effects propagate and magnify aggregate shocks. This is consistent
with evidence in Kashyap, Stein andWilcox (1993) (hereinafter KSW), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993),
(1994) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) (hereinafter BGG) who relate debt issue patterns
of firms that have deferential capital market access, using size or bank-dependence as proxies,
with aggregate and cohort investment following Federal Reserve monetary contractions or at the
onset of recessions.4 Theoretically, this paper adds to the credit cycle literature by simultaneously
considering how differential access to capital markets and investment across firms interacts with the
choice of financing (capital structure) and the macroeconomy.
The link between security issues and macroeconomic conditions has been analyzed in several
empirical and theoretical studies.5 In general, these studies are motivated in a Myers and Majluf
2See for example Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), Cooley and Quadrini (1999), Fisher (1998), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
For a review and a distinction between the different channels see Bernanke and Gertler (1995). For a review of the
literature which addresses the relation between financial structure and aggregate activity see Gertler (1988).
3In the case of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) and Biais and Casamatta (1999) both debt and outside
equity is issued. However, equity risk can be completely diversified since there is no aggregate uncertainty. In
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) dynamics are achieved by considering an unexpected perturbation from the
steady state. The focus of the macroeconomic analysis in Biais and Casamatta (1999) is on the relation between
capital structure and exogenous shocks to the severity of agency problems. Cooley and Quadrini (1998), (1999) do
consider heterogeneous firms that issue both debt and risky equity. However, the model imposes restrictions on the
types and timing of security issues. Furthermore, their model has a different set of predictions regarding the effects
of productivity shocks on capital structure across firms.
4Specifically, KSW provide evidence supporting the view that capital market imperfections result in inefficient
reductions in investments following a Federal Reserve monetary tightening. BGG also relate the shift in inventory
investment away from small (or bank-dependent) firms following a Federal Reserve monetary tightening with the
asymmetry in access to capital markets across firms. This is consistent with Chirinko and Schaller(1995), Faz-
zari, Hubbard and Peterson(1988), Gilchrist and Himmelberg(1995), Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited(1995) and
Whited(1992), who present firm level evidence suggesting that cash flows, and therefore access to capital markets,
affect investment decisions.
5As discussed in Korajczyk and Levy (2000), the arguments used to explain cross-sectional variation in capital
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(1984) setting where privately informed managers have current equity owners interest in mind and
avoid issuing equity when they believe their shares are underpriced. This adverse selection results in
an equity issue announcement conveying unfavorable news about the firm’s prospects, resulting in a
negative price reaction.6 Lucas and McDonald (1990) extend Myers and Majluf’s (1984) theory to
a dynamic setting where managers, with private information about their company’s value, cannot
issue debt and delay equity issues until their stock price rises to or above its true value. Since
market prices are correlated across firms, equity issues cluster around market peaks. Choe, Masulis
and Nanda (1993) argue that adverse selection costs vary counter-cyclically to explain the general
increase in equity issues during expansions. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) argue that “windows of
opportunity” in which capital can be raised at favorable terms result in observed periods of extreme
equity issue volume (or “hot” equity markets) as firms time their equity issues. Both Choe, Masulis
and Nanda (1993) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) show that, in general, the price reaction to
equity issue announcements is less negative during these periods. Although these papers are helpful
in describing some of the regularities in the data, they are not complete. For example, during
both expansions of the 1970s, the equity market preformed poorly and the average price drop upon
an equity issue announcement was relatively large, yet equity issues as a fraction of total external
financing was relatively high.7 Moreover, Korajczyk and Levy (2000) document that after correcting
structure, such as variations in debt tax shields, deadweight bankruptcy costs, the debt overhand problem (Myers
(1977)), or the risk shifting problem (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), have a difficult time explaining the observed
counter-cyclical variation in leverage for firms that do not face severe capital constraints. During contractions profits
are low, resulting in lower debt tax shields and higher expected bankruptcy costs, both of which reduce the benefits
of debt. Moreover, debt overhand and risk shifting problems are generally associated with firms that are close to
their debt capacity, suggesting that these problems are not binding.
6To explain the negative price reaction to equity issue announcements observed in the data, Jensen (1986) uses
a moral hazard argument, as apposed to adverse selection, where managers indulge themselves when they are not
forced to make debt interest payments.
7Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) document that the average price reaction to an equity issue announcement was
4for the run-up in the equity market and the variation in the expected price reaction to an equity
issue announcement, deviations from target leverage ratios that vary with macroeconomic conditions
account for a significant amount of the variation in issue choice.8 Theoretically, this paper adds
to this literature by linking variations in financing choices with macroeconomic conditions using
arguments that do not rely on the variation in the price reaction to equity issues in a setting where
managers, that face various degrees of financial constraints, can issue either equity or debt securities.
As discussed in Zwiebel (1996), the notion that agency conflicts between managers and outside
owners of the firm are important determinants of capital structure, as proposed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) or Jensen (1986), is now widely accepted. Moreover, the notion that capital
structure is voluntarily chosen by mangers is also recognized and discussed in Zwiebel (1996).
In this spirit, I model two firm level factors that affect managers’ capital structure choice, the
inability to write state-contingent contracts due to agency problems and managerial risk aversion
(the setting of Modigliani and Miller (1958) does not apply). Based on Levy (1999), and similar to
Lacker and Weinberg (1989), a conflict between the manager and outside shareholders arises from
the assumption that managers can misreport output or extract private benefits, but at a deadweight
cost. Since the manager bears only a fraction of these costs, his portion of the equity must be large
enough to offset the incentive to misreport. As a result, holding the manager’s absolute investment
in the firm fixed, increases in the fraction of the firm financed by outside debt increase the manager’s
-3.6% between 1976 and 1979 and -2.0% during their classified “normal” markets. Meanwhile, Choe, Masulis and
Nanda (1993) document that the dollar amount of equity issues as a fraction of the sum of equity and straight debt
issues for companies listed in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ was 40% between April 1975 and January 1980 and
18% for their entire sample period between January 1971 and December 1991.
8Korajczyk and Levy (2000) also document that the unusually high leverage during the expansion in the 1980s
(see Bernanke and Blinder (1988)) was a result of variations in firm characteristics, with high growth in aggregate
corporate profits and high returns on the equity market driving leverage lower.
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share of the equity and mitigates the conflict. However, increased leverage increases the risk of the
manager’s equity, resulting in inefficient risk sharing. Moreover, a second assumed agency problem
places an upper bound on leverage. Specifically, a manager may liquidate his firm or use assets
to his private benefit, but at a deadweight cost. Since the manager does not own the entire firm,
he bears only a fraction of these costs. It is shown that the condition ensuring a manager will
not liquidate is equivalent to placing an upper bound on leverage. Resolving the tension between
the manager’s incentives to misreport or liquidate his firm and his desire to share risk results in a
constrained-optimal capital structure.9
At the macroeconomic level, the fraction of wealth held by managers varies over the business
cycle and is the driving force in the model. Consider a two period economy where households can
only save by investing with managers that face lax leverage constraints. When managers have most
of the wealth, they have no incentive to misreport since they own most of their equity. The agency
problem does not bind, so perfect risk sharing can be achieved and no debt is issued. Alternatively,
suppose households have most of the wealth and therefore have a high demand for securities. Since
each manager must hold a large enough fraction of his firm’s equity to discourage misreporting,
the fraction of the firm financed by debt must be high. However, to induce managers to take such
levered positions, the return households require on debt must be low enough so that the benefits
of leverage to managers offset the cost of inefficient risk sharing. In equilibrium, managers hold
levered equity in their firms while households hold levered equity and debt.
9For a review of the literate that relates these sorts of conflicts to capital structure choice see Harris and Raviv
(1991), (1992) and references therein. Others have also analyzed financing choices in dynamic frameworks but have
not simultaneously linked the choice of financial contracts, investment and macroeconomic conditions as this paper
does (e.g. Leland (1998)).
6In a multi-period setting, the relative wealth of managers and households is endogenous, since
savings are carried forward from the previous period. Relative wealth is affected by the realized
productivity of capital since managers hold leveraged positions in their firms. A low realization
of aggregate output results in leveraged managers receiving a relatively small portion of aggregate
wealth. When managers have a small proportion of aggregate wealth, they increase leverage if they
are not up against their leverage constraint. Since manager compensation is positively related with
corporate profits (e.g. bonuses) as well as equity performance (e.g. equity or option compensation),
the model predicts that during periods of low corporate profits or poor equity performance target
debt ratios will be relatively high.
In the paper I consider a stochastic, general equilibrium model with three classes of risk-averse
agents: households and two classes of managers. Managers are distinguished by their stochastic
constant returns to scale production technologies and the degree of their agency problems. Due
to its complexity, the model must be solved numerically. The production technology and agency
parameters are the key features distinguishing firms in the model. In the calibration, these features
are identified using dividend-payout ratios and firm size as proxies, and are based on COMPUSTAT
data and statistics reported in Holderness, Krozner and Sheehan (1999).
In simulating the calibrated model, I find that low agency cost firms have a pronounced counter-
cyclical variation in leverage and outstanding debt as well as pro-cyclical variation in outstanding
equity. Meanwhile, high agency cost firms exhibit no variation in leverage, but pro-cyclical variation
in outstanding debt and equity. Investment and expected future growth are pro-cyclical despite
independent productivity shocks. Moreover, since high agency cost firms are up against their
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borrowing constraints, there is an inefficient reduction in their investment relative to the aggregate
during contractions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents a two period model with a
single class of managers to develop the basic intuition behind the agency problems. Section 2 solves
the full, infinite horizon model and presents the calibrated parameter choices. Section 3 discusses
and interprets the results from simulating the economies of Section 2. Section 4 concludes with
direction for future research.
1 A Two Period Model
I begin by describing the economic environment and contracting problem in the context of a two
period model. Examples are presented to illustrate how agency problems affect capital structure.
1.1 The Economic Environment
There are two periods t ∈ {0, 1}, a single consumption good, and two classes of agents: households
and managers. Agents begin period 0 with an exogenous endowment of consumption good wealth.
Households receive an additional exogenous endowment of the consumption good at the beginning
of period 1. Each manager has private access to a random, inter-temporal production technology,
f(ω, i) = ωi, where i is the amount of the consumption good invested at period 0 and ω is a common
random variable with support [ω,ω], ω > 0 (see Section 3.2 for a discussion). Let Ω denote the
common period 0 information set. At period 0, each manager chooses how much to consume and
how much to invest in the production technology. The manager can raise additional capital by
issuing securities. Similarly, each household must choose between consumption and investing in
8securities.
All agents have CRRA utility, with coefficient of risk aversion α. The discount rates for the
households and managers are β and βx respectively. The expected utility of a manager and a
household with respective consumptions, cm and ch, and period 0 expectations, EΩ, are:
Um(c0, c1) =
(cm0 )
1−α
1− α + EΩβx
(cm1 )
1−α
1− α ; 0 < x ≤ 1 (1)
and
Uh(c0, c1) =
(ch0)
1−α
1− α + EΩβ
(ch1)
1−α
1− α (2)
Assumption 1 Managers are weakly less patient than households: 0 < x ≤ 1
Assumption 1 is necessary in the infinite horizon setting to ensure managers do not accumulate
wealth to the point where the agency problem is not binding (see footnote 20).
1.1.1 The contracting environment
It is assumed that only managers can issue securities.
Assumption 2 Only managers can issue securities.
However, conflicts between manager j and outside security holders (households) arise because
period 1 output (ωij) is not contractible. Security payoffs can be functions of the total amount
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invested in the manager’s firm (ij), period 0 transfers from households to the manager (ijh) and the
manager’s report (if one is made) about the realization of output (ωˆij).
Assumption 3 is the basis of the conflict between outside security holders and managers.
Assumption 3 After production output ωij is realized, the manager can (A) take an action to
(mis)report output ωˆij at the deadweight cost (1−ψ)×(ωij− ωˆij) for ω ≥ ωˆ, keeping ψ×(ωij− ωˆij)
in addition to his contractual payoff OR (B) make no report and liquidate the entire firm at a
deadweight cost (1− ψ)ωij + ψγij, keeping ψωij − ψγij for himself.
(1 − ψ) should be thought of as a measure of transparency. A high (1− ψ) implies a manager
incurs a maximal cost (minimal benefit) to misreport/embezzle. (1− ψ) can represent the cost of
falsifying records, or ψ can represent the fraction of benefits a manager can attain from inappropriate
use of funds. If the manager liquidates the entire firm, he runs off with ψωij − ψγij and outside
security holders get nothing. (1 − ψ)ωij + ψγij can be thought of as a liquidation cost, ψγij, in
addition to the cost of reporting ωˆ = 0, which is not on the support of ω.10 γ should be thought of
as a measure of illiquidity associated with a specialized asset. A high γ implies a manager incurs
maximal cost (minimal benefit) to liquidate. γ can represent the cost of selling an illiquid asset,
or (1− γ) can represent the fraction of benefits a manger can attain from inappropriately using a
specialized asset.11
10Although the notation ψωij − γˆij (where γˆ = ψγ) is more intuitive, ψωij − ψγij allows for simpler expressions
in the remaining analysis.
11Although quite general, the functional form of the liquidation option is chosen to place an upper bound on
leverage (see below). However, I expect alternative functional forms, as well as a variety of agency problems that
limit borrowing, such as asset substitution or debt overhang, will result in similar leverage patterns obtained in this
paper for firms that are far from their borrowing constraints. The credit channel literature (see the introduction)
has recognized and explored the subtleties of alternative binding borrowing constraints.
10
Assumption 4 restricts managers to issuing debt and equity securities and receiving equity
compensation (see Sections 2.2.3 and 3.2 for discussions).12
Assumption 4 Manager j can only issue two types of securities: debt and equity. Specifically, the
manager can issue debt whose payoff, bj , is independent of the report ωˆij, as well as a share (1−sj)
of equity with payoff, (1− sj)(ωˆij − bj). The manager’s contractual compensation is the remaining
share sj of the equity payoff, sj(ωˆij − bj).
Figure 1-1 summarizes the timing of actions and payoffs.
Figure 1-1 - Timing & Payoffs
period 0
◦ agents receive their endowments
◦ securities are issued and households transfer a
total of ijh to manager j
◦ a total of ij is invested by manager j
◦ consumption takes place
period 1
◦ agents receive their endowments
◦ manager j liquidates his firm or reports ωˆij
− if the firm is liquidated:
households are paid nothing,
the manager gets ψωij − ψγij
− if the manager reports ωˆij :
outside equity holders are paid (1− sj)(ωˆij − bj),
debt holders are paid bj,
the manager gets sj(ωˆij − bj) + ψ × (ωij − ωˆij)
◦ consumption takes place
Proposition 1 describes how Assumption 3 relates to capital structure choice.
12Given the assumed agency problems, the restriction to contracts whose payoffs are linear in the manager’s output
report is not necessary in a slightly different setting, such as Levy (1999) or Lacker and Weinberg (1989). A general
class of agency problems that achieves similar qualitative results is discussed in Section 3.2 (also see footnote 19).
Capital Structure 11
Proposition 1 (A) Manager j always reports truthfully iff sj ≥ ψ. (B) When sj ≥ ψ manager j
never liquidates iff leverage is bounded by (s
j−ψ)ω+ψγ
sj
: (s
j−ψ)ω+ψγ
sj
≥ bj
ij
.
Proof. See Appendix 1
Proposition 1 (A) relates the marginal cost to misreport, (1− ψ), to the slope (equity share) of
managerial payoffs. If the cost to misreport (1− ψ) is high, managers do not have to hold much of
the equity (ψ) to ensure truthful reporting. Proposition 1 (B) presents the condition that ensures
managers will never liquidate and always make a report of output. The liquidation option introduces
a lower bound on managers’ compensation that is translated to a restriction on leverage.13
As shown in Proposition 2, securities that result in truth telling and no liquidation dominate
securities that result in non-truth telling or liquidation.
Proposition 2 (A) Securities that result in truth telling strictly dominate securities that result in
false reports. (B) Securities that result in no liquidation strictly dominate securities that result in
liquidation if for every state ωˇ > ω the price-density of a contingent unit claim in state ω, pˆω,
satisfies either (i)
R ω
ωˇ pˆω∂ω − ωˇpˆωˇ ≤ 0 OR (ii)
∂pˆω
∂ω ≤ 0 and (ω − 2ωˇ) ≤ 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1
Since all of the economies I consider satisfy either condition (i) or (ii) of Proposition 2 (B),
I restrict attention to securities with truth telling and no liquidation without loss of generality.
Since payoffs from debt securities are assumed to be independent of the report (Assumption 4), no
13A manager that is indifferent between liquidating and reporting is assumed to report. A manger that is indifferent
between reporting truthfully and falsifying is assumed to report truthfully.
12
liquidation implies that debt is risk-free in equilibrium.14
1.1.2 Manager j’s problem
At period 0, manager j begins with wealth wj0 and information Ω. A manager must choose the
total amount invested in his firm, ij , as well as the face value of debt, bj, and the share of outside
equity, 1 − sj , to issue. Since it will be verified that internal returns are higher than equilibrium
market returns, and since production shocks are assumed to be common, it is clear that a manager
will never invest with a different manager. Moreover, by Assumption 4 managers can not short-
sell shares of different managers.15 The manager maximizes utility, equation (1), with respect to
cj0, c
j
1, i
j, bj and sj subject to the budget constraints
cj0 ≤ w
j
0 − (ij − (1− sj)(pij − pbbj)− pbbj), (3)
cj1 ≤ sj(ωij − bj),
and the no liquidation (leverage γ) and truthful reporting (equity ψ) constraints
(sj − ψ)ω + ψγ
sj
≥ b
j
ij
,
sj ≥ ψ,
where pb and p are period 0 market prices of a risk-free claim to one unit of consumption and a unit
of production output ω (unlevered equity) at period 1; the return on levered equity will be reported
14The restriction on state prices in Proposition 2 is similar to a requirement that a firm’s return covary positively
with the market/consumption; in a CAPM setting this is similar to having a positive beta. To see when liquidation
may be optimal, consider the case where a firm’s return covaries negatively with the market. This implies that
when the market preforms well and state prices are low, the firm preforms poorly and the undiversified manager’s
consumption is low. When state prices are sufficiently low, the manager may do better by smoothing consumption
through liquidation since the market does not place much value on the resulting losses.
15If managers can short sell, the assumption of identical shocks would allow them to completely undo the problem
of inefficient risk sharing (also see Section 3.2).
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with the results. Notice that the manager’s technology is constant returns to scale, implying that
a world with no agency problem will have p = 1; the cost of a security with payoff ω is 1. It is not
surprising, as Proposition 3 shows, that the equity constraint generically binds when the return on
the technology exceeds market returns.
Proposition 3 When (s
j−ψ)ω+ψγ
sj
> b
j
ij
, it is sufficient for p > 1 to ensure sj = ψ.When (sj−ψ)ω+ψγ
sj
=
bj
ij
it is sufficient for p > 1 and 3γ ≥ ω to ensure sj = ψ.
The condition that 3γ ≥ ω ensures the equity constraint binds whenever the borrowing constraint
binds. Since parameters are such that sj = ψ in all the equilibria considered, it is taken as given
for the remainder of the discussion. Moreover, the restriction on leverage reduces to γ ≥ bj
ij
when
sj = ψ.
1.1.3 Household k’s problem
At period 0, household k begins with wealth wk0 and information Ω. In addition, household k receives
an exogenous endowment of lk1 , at the beginning of period 1. At period 0, the household chooses the
shares of equity, sk and the face value of bond holdings, bk. They are restricted from short-selling
any securities by Assumption 2. The household maximizes utility, equation (2), with respect to
ck0, c
k
1, b
k and sk subject to the budget constraints
ck0 ≤ wk0 − sk(pi− pbb) + pbbk, (4)
ck1 ≤ lk1 + sk(ωi− b)− bk,
and the borrowing and short-sales constraints
−bk ≥ 0,
14
sk ≥ 0,
where b and i denote the total face value of debt issued and the total invested by managers at period
0.
1.1.4 Equilibrium
Aggregate disposable wealth consists of output from investment as well as the endowment process.
Market clearing requires
sm + sh = 1, (5)
bm + bh = 0,
and
ch0 + c
m
0 + i = w
h
0 + w
m
0 , (6)
ch1 + c
m
1 = ωi+ lh1 ,
where superscripts m and h denote manager and household aggregates.
When the borrowing constraint does not bind, the first order necessary conditions from each
manager’s optimization problem imply that
p =
1
1− ψ −
ψEΩ[βxω(cm1 )−α]
(1− ψ)(cm0 )−α
, (7)
and
pb =
EΩ[βx(cm1 )−α]
(cm0 )
−α . (8)
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When the borrowing constraint binds, equation (8) is replaced by
bm
i
= γ. (9)
Similarly, when the borrowing and short selling conditions do not bind, the first order necessary
conditions from each household’s optimization problem imply that
p =
pbbm
i
+
EΩ[β(ωi− bm)(ch1)−α]
i(ch0)
−α , (10)
and
pb =
EΩ[β(ch1)−α]
(ch0)
−α . (11)
Notice that equation (10) is equivalent to the standard FOC for equity holdings, but is represented
differently because the price for unlevered equity is used.
When the short sales or borrowing constraints bind, equations (10) or (11) are respectively
replaced by
sh = 0, (12)
and
bh = 0. (13)
At period 0, the unknowns are p, pb, cm0 , c
h
0 , and b
m. The equilibrium is defined by the consump-
tion constraints in equations (3) and (4), the market-clearing conditions in equations (5) and (6),
asset equations (7), (8)or (9), (10) or (12) and (11) or (13).
16
1.2 Discussion and Equilibrium
This subsection illustrates how the relative distribution of wealth between managers and households
affects capital structure choice. I consider the relative initial wealth for managers w
m
0
W
∈ [2.5%, 12.5%]
to demonstrate a range of economies where the agency problem is severe (when managers have little
wealth) to less severe (when managers have more wealth), where total initial wealthW = wm0 +w
h
0 =
1.16
In this model, as wealth shifts between managers and households, capital structure changes are
due to general equilibrium conditions alone, rather than individual wealth effects. The manager’s
capital structure choice can be interpreted as a portfolio choice problem where the manager chooses
the proportion of debt and equity. Since managers have CRRA preferences and face technologies
with constant returns to scale, changes in wealth do not affect portfolio weights. Therefore, capital
structure is invariant to the wealth of any single manager. The change in capital structure is the
result of relative aggregate wealth on agency problems, and hence on required market returns.
Table 1-1, below, presents results for the base parameter choices where x = 1 (the utility
functions for managers and households are identical), β = 0.95, α = 2.5, ψ = 0.35, γ = 0.75,
ω ∈ {1.1, 1.3}, Pr[ω = 1.3] = 0.5 and lh1 = 0.6.
Firstly, look at the effect of wealth changes on leverage and returns. The negative relationship
observed in Table 1-1 between leverage, b
i
, andmanagers’ endowment, wm0 , follows from the argument
that leverage increases when wm0 decreases in order to maintain the manager’s fraction, ψ of the
16The equilibrium is solved numerically using a modified version of the “auctioneer algorithm” developed in Lucas
(1994). We discuss the modifications as well as approximation errors in Appendix 2.
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equity and allow demand for securities by households to equal supply. Notice that the leverage
constraint γ = 0.75 binds when w
m
0
W
∈ {2.5, 5}. Market returns on unlevered equity, E[r] = E[ω]
p
− 1
and risk free debt, rf , adjust so that leverage is chosen optimally. The difference betweenE[r] and the
expected return on the production technology, E[ω]−1 = 20% is a measure of the rents appropriated
by managers as the result of agency problems, and is monotonically decreasing with the manager’s
endowment, wm0 . When
wm0
W
∈ {2.5, 5}, low market returns, E[r] and rf , reflect household desire to
save across periods when financial instruments are scarce; managers are restricted in issuing both
equity and debt. As managers’ endowment increase, the economy can achieve appropriate incentives
at lower costs through better risk sharing.
Increases in leverage, and therefore risk, drive the negative relationship between the equity
premium, E[re − rf ] = E[ωi−b]pi−pbb − (1 + rf), and managers’ endowment, w
m
0 up to the case
wm0
W
= 5%.
The reduction in the equity premium from the case w
m
0
W
= 5% to w
m
0
W
= 2.5% is a result of decreased
risk (leverage is constant). Although payoffs are constant, higher prices result in market returns
having a lower standard deviation.
A wealth change also affects equilibrium investment. The differences in investment across
economies (the row labeled i
W
) is due to the relative savings rates of managers and households
which is affected by three factors: risk, return, and period 1 endowment (lh1). Managers’ positions
are riskier, which increases their savings since α > 1. At the same time,managers receive higher ex-
pected returns, which lowers their savings since α > 1. Finally, since managers do not have period 1
endowment, they must rely on investment for period 1 income, which increases their savings. Since
total investment is increasing with wm0 , the higher managerial savings dominates lower household
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savings.17,18
Table 1− 1 : equilibrium under various initial relative
managerial wealth levels (percent)
manager wealth w
m
0
W
2.5 5 7.5 10 12.5
leverage b
i
75.0 75.0 57.3 38.1 18.7
unlevered equity E[r] 5.5 17.7 18.8 19.1 19.3
risk free rf 5.2 17.3 18.4 18.7 18.9
equity premium E[re − rf ] 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5
investment i
W
18.47 19.93 20.04 20.05 20.07
β=0.95,x=1,α=2.5,ψ=0.35,γ=0.75,ω∈{1.1,1.3},Pr[ω=1.3]=0.5,lh1=0.6
2 The Full Model
In this section the model is generalized to an infinite horizon setting with two classes of managers.
2.1 The Economic Environment
There are now households as well as two classes of managers distinguished by agency parameters ψ
and γ as well as the stochastic process for their investment outcomes. Due to the complexity of the
problem, two period securities are taken as given. Periods are linked only by the relative wealth
of each class of agent carried forward from the previous period. Every period output is realized,
securities are paid and new securities are issued. Implicitly, the degree of anonymity in the market
is high enough that upon deviation, the manager can raise funds with no discrimination. I expect
that the qualitative results remain if securities are generalized to be history dependent as argued
17It is possible for the relation between i and wm0 to be non monotonic, although not for the chosen parameters.
18The result that managers have a higher savings rate is consistent with empirical findings in Gentry and Hubbard
(1998). Although Gentry and Hubbard attribute high savings rates to high external finance costs and high internal
returns, they do recognize that entrepreneurs face greater income risk and therefore might save more for precautionary
reasons.
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in Section 3.2.
2.1.1 Manager j of class z’s problem
At each period, t, manager j of class z begins with wealth wjt and information Ωt. Wealth at period
t includes income from his investments at period t− 1, as well as an exogenous endowment stream,
ljt . The manager must choose how much his firm will invest, i
j
t , the face value of debt, b
j
t , and
the share of outside equity, 1 − sjt,z, to issue. Moreover, he must choose the share of the other
firm class’ equity, sjt,−z, to hold on his own account, where −z denotes the other class of managers;
sjt,−z must be non-negative by Assumption 4.
19 Since it will be verified that internal returns are
higher than equilibrium market returns, and since production shocks are assumed to be common,
it is clear that a manager will never invest with a different manager in the same class. The higher
returns for managers also result in higher wealth accumulation. To avoid the unrealistic scenario
where the economy converges to a steady state with no agency problems, the managerial sector is
now assumed to be less patient, x < 1 (Assumption 1).20 The manager has following maximization
problem:
19With more structure Assumption 4 can be relaxed to allow sjt,−z to be purchased on the firm’s account without
changing the manager’s problem. Specifically, if the return on traded securities cannot be falsified and if managers
incur no cost upon liquidating financial assets (due to their liquid nature), the equity constraint would not be affected
and the borrowing constraint would be tighter. This is excluded for brevity.
20This can potentially be endognized by introducing random project destruction. Formally, if managers are re-
stricted from diversifying project destruction shocks and project destruction occurs after contracts are paid off with
probability (1 − x), we can simply augment the discount factor for managers by x. The desired result follows from
manager j’s first order necessary conditions as he maximizes utility with respect to ij (in order for utility to be
well defined when projects pay 0, give managers a small endowment in the following period). Also see Blanchard
(1985). Alternatively, a model where agents have finite lives (e.g. an overlapping generations model) can achieve
the desired result as each generation starts with limited wealth. Kyotaki and Moore (1997) achieve an equivalent
result by assuming farmers must consume at least an exogenous fraction of output; effectively, they are less patient.
Carlstrom and Furst (1997) also assume entrepreneurs (managers) are less patient.
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max
{cj ,ij ,bj ,sjz ,sj−z}t
EΩt
∞X
τ=0
(xzβ)t
(cjt+τ )
1−α
1− α ,
with budget and wealth constraints
cjt ≤ wjt − (ijt,z − (1− sjz)(pt,zi
j
t,z − pbtb
j
t)− pbtb
j
t)− sjt,−z(pt,−zit,−z − pbtbt,−z),
wjt = s
j
z(ωt,zi
j
t−1,z − b
j
t−1) + s
j
t−1,−z(ωt,−zit−1,−z − bt−1,−z) + l
j
t , (14)
and the borrowing, equity and short-sales constraints
(sjt,j − ψz)ωz + ψzγz
sjt,j
≥ b
j
t
ijt
,
sjt,−z ≥ 0,
sjt,j ≥ ψz,
where pbt and pt,z are the period t market prices of a risk-free claim to one unit of consumption and
a unit of production output ωt,z (unlevered equity) at period 1; the return on levered equity will
be reported with the results. bt,−z and it,−z denote the total face value of debt issued and the total
invested by managers of class −z at period t. Since parameters are such that sjt,j = ψz in almost
all of the realized states in the simulations considered, it is taken as given for the discussion (the
borrowing constraint reduces to γz ≥
bjt
ijt
).
2.1.2 Household k’s problem
At each period, t, household k begins with wealth wkt and information Ωt. Wealth at period t
includes income from investments at period t − 1, as well as an exogenous endowment stream,
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lkt . The household chooses the shares of equity, s
k
t,1 and s
k
t,2 as well as the face value of debt, b
k
t .
Households are restricted from short-selling any securities by Assumption 2. Household i faces the
following problem:
max
{ck,sk1 ,sk2 ,bk}t
EΩt
∞X
τ=0
βt (c
k
t+τ )
1−α
1− α ,
with budget and wealth constraints
ckt ≤ wkt − skt,1(pt,1it,1 − pbtbt,1)− skt,2(pt,2it,2 − pbtbt,2) + pbtbkt , (15)
wkt = s
k
t−1,1(ωt,1it−1,1 − bt−1,1) + skt−1,2(ωt,2it−1,2 − bt−1,2)− bkt−1 + lkt ,
and the borrowing and short-sales constraints
−bkt ≥ 0,
skt,z ≥ 0 for all z.
2.1.3 Equilibrium
At period t, aggregate disposable wealth consists of output from each class, ωt,1it−1,1 and ωt,2it−1,2,as
well as the endowment process for households and managers, lht , l
m1
t and l
m2
t . The market clearing
requires
sht,1 + s
m1
t,1 + s
m2
t,1 = 1,
sht,2 + s
m1
t,2 + s
m2
t,2 = 1, (16)
bm1t + b
m2
t + b
h
t = 0,
and
yt = c
h
t + c
m1
t + c
m2
t + it,1 + it,2 = ωt,1it−1,1 + ωt,2it−1,1 + lht + lm1t + lm2t , (17)
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where superscripts mz and h denote class z manager and household aggregates.
When the borrowing constraint does not bind, the first order necessary conditions from each
manager’s optimization problem imply that, for all t and z,
pt,z =
1
1− ψz
−
ψzxzβEΩt [ωz(cmzt+1)−α]
(1− ψz)(cmzt )−α
, (18)
pt,−z = −
pbbt,−z
it,−z
+
xzβEΩt [(ωt,−zit,−z − bt,−z)(cmzt+1)−α]
it,−z(c
mz
t )
−α , (19)
and
pbt =
xzβEΩt [(cmzt+1)−α]
(cmzt )
−α . (20)
When the short sales or borrowing constraints bind equations (19) or (20) are respectively
replaced by
smzt,−z = 0, (21)
or
bmzt = γzi
j
t . (22)
Similarly, when the borrowing and short selling conditions do not bind, the first order necessary
conditions from each household’s optimization problem imply that, for all t and z,
pt,z = −
pbbt,z
it,z
+
βEΩt [(ωt,zit,z − bt,z)(cht+1)−α]
it,z(cht )
−α (23)
and
pbt =
βEΩt [(cht+1)−α]
(cht )
−α . (24)
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When the short sales or borrowing constraints bind, equations (23) or (24) are respectively replaced
by
sht,z = 0 (25)
or
bht = 0. (26)
At period t, the unknowns are pt,z, pbt , c
mz
t , c
h
t , b
mz
t , b
h
t , and s
h
t,z for z = {1, 2}. The equilibrium
is defined by the budget constraints in equations (14) and (15), the market-clearing conditions in
equations (16) and (17) and asset equations (18), (19) or (21) (for z = {1, 2}), (20) or (22) (for
z = {1, 2}), (23) or (25) (for z = {1, 2}) and (24) or (26). I only consider stationary equilibria in
which the consumption growth rate, investment rules, security issue rules, security purchase rules
and equilibrium prices are functions of the period t state, Ωt.
2.2 State Variables and Parameter Calibration
The exogenous state is described by a Markov chain that gives the dynamics of the stochastic
production outcomes, ωt,1 and ωt,2. The state Ωt includes these exogenous variables as well as the
endogenous distribution of wealth.
2.2.1 Class 1 and class 2 firms
Managers and production technologies are parameterized to firms that face low (class 1) and high
(class 2) agency costs associated with accessing capital markets. Absent a direct measure of agency
problems and motivated by a variety sources, dividend-payout ratios and firm size are used as
proxies. In the model, only two period securities are considered resulting in a dividend-payout ratio
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of unity. However, theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen (1988)) support the view that firms in need of cash (and therefore constrained in accessing
capital markets) pay lower dividends. When dividend-payout ratios are unavailable, firm size is used
as the proxy and is motivated by the credit channel literature.21 Papers such as BGG obtain similar
results regarding the relation between inventory investment and macroeconomic conditions when
using size or a firm’s reliance on bank loans versus public financial markets as a proxy for agency
costs in accessing external capital. Moreover, as seen in Table 2-2 there is a strong relationship
between firm size and the dividend-payout ratio.
2.2.2 Calibration of the Markov chain
Ideally, the Markov chain should capture the uncertainty managers face when making investment
decisions as well as uncertainty households face when saving in the market. In the model, man-
agers face the stochastic return ω on investment i: f(ω, i) = ωi. The analogue measure in the
world is the stochastic value of a firm for a given level of investment in assets: Market Value of
Firmt+ ^Dividendst+Interest Paymentst = ωt×Book Value of Assetst−1. This assumes one period
represents one year, marginal returns equal average returns and the present value of growth oppor-
tunities can be realized immediately. Following this logic, the Markov chain is calibrated so that
each firm receives a stochastic return on investment, ωt =
^Market Value of Firmt+Dividendst+Interest Paymentst
Book Value of Assetst−1
,
whose dynamics are described by
logωz,t = µz + σzu˜z,t, (27)
21In the model, due to aggregation, the measure of agents in each class is somewhat nebulous as we can assume
that there are B managers of class 1 and S managers of class 2, where S >> B.
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where u˜z,t represents white noise with unit variance.22,23 The parameters of equation (27) are es-
timated for each firm in a sample from COMPUSTAT.24 Appendix 2 describes the data in more
detail. Table 2-1 describes the Markov chains implied from descretizing the state space using the
techniques developed in Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
The Markov chain is set to capture heterogeneous firm level dynamics as well as equity market
dynamics. This is done by decomposing ωz,t so that ωz,t = ωaggregate,t×ωidiosyncratic z,t. ωaggregate,t is
calibrated so the standard deviation of the equity market approximately matches the data (Heaton
and Lucas (1996) Table 3 cites 17.3%). Following the discussion in Section 2.2.1, ωidiosyncratic z,t
is set so that logωz,t has a mean µz and standard deviation σz, the cross-sectional medians from
estimating equation (27) conditional on the firm having a dividend-payout ratio in the top two-
thirds of the sample when z = 1, and the bottom third of the sample when z = 2. For a more
complete description of the procedure and results see Appendix 2.
22Since the model is driven by the distribution of wealth, it is calibrated to capture innovations that have market
value, that include realized production. Since market values tend to be more volatile than output (see the literature
on the equity premium puzzle) it is taken as given that some market friction(s) other than those modeled here
produce this “excess” volatility.
23By using a stochastic constant returns to scale technology with innovations that are independent and identically
distributed across time, variations in leverage ratios and expected market returns can be attributed to the distribution
of wealth in the economy.
24Since µi represents average return, not the marginal return it is overstated. This results in managers issuing
more debt in the model. Since managers tend to know more about future returns than the unconditional mean, σi
is probably overstated. This results in managers issuing less debt in the model.
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Table 2− 1
Markov chain for exogenous state variables:
Combined idiosyncratic and aggregate components
State
number
ω1 ω2
1 1.580 0.827
2 0.897 1.716
3 1.243 0.651
4 0.706 1.350
The transition probability matrix is equally weighted and independent across states
2.2.3 Other parameters
I now describe the motivation behind the other parameter choices. The truth telling agency para-
meter (ψ), that can be measured by managerial equity stake, is calibrated using statistics reported
in Holderness, Krozner and Sheehan (1999). Median (mean) managerial equity ownership, adjusted
for option compensation, across deciles of the market value of equity (dividend-payout ratios are
not reported) for firms in their 1995 sample ranges from 30.6% (33.3%) in the smallest decile to
1.5% (5.4%) in the largest decile, with an overall median (mean) of 14.4% (21.1%). ψ1 is set at
0.04, the median ownership of the second largest equity value decile, the decile whose midpoint is
closest to the median equity market value from my sample of high dividend payout firms (see Table
2-2). ψ2 is then set at 0.20, approximately the median ownership of the seven smallest deciles.
To adjust for the variety of other incentive contracts, I use statistics reported in Holderness,
Krozner and Sheehan (1999). They report the ratio of median (mean) dollar value of managerial
equity ownership to median (mean) compensation, defined as salary plus bonus, for the five highest
paid executives in firms included in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap, and S&P SmallCap 500 was 4
(20) in 1932 and 12 (32) in 1995. I use a conservative approach by treating this compensation as
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low risk and provide managers an endowment stream that is proportional to the entire economy,
lmzt = l
mzyt. lmz is then set to 0.005 for both classes so that
E[
P
z ψ(ωt,zi
j
t−1,z−b
j
t−1)]
E[
P
z l
mz
t ]
equals 8, the
average of the two medians.25
The parameter γ places an upper bound on leverage. γ1 and γ2 are respectively set at 0.25 and
0.2 so that leverage in the simulated economy is close to that observed in the data and reported in
Table 2-2.
Table 2− 2
Medians [means] from COMPUSTAT sample
High dividend
payout firms
Low dividend
payout firms
Dividend
Net Income
0.163
[0.203]
0.054
[0.043]
Market Value of
Equity in 1995
$1, 397 Million
[$5, 503 Million]
$328 Million
[$2, 328 Million]
Book Value of
Assets in 1995
$1, 613 Million
[$5, 461 Million]
$317 Million
[$2, 539 Million]
Book Value of Debt
Book Value of Assets
0.242
[0.245]
0.206
[0.206]
The household endowment, lht , is set to be a constant proportion, of the economy at period t−1,
lht = l
hyt−1. lh is set at 0.65 so that the standard deviation of growth in the simulated economy is
approximately 4.5%, the standard deviation of real net worth growth of households and nonprofit
organizations reported in the Flow of Funds.26,27
25Giving managers a small endowment also places a lower bound on their wealth. This allows for computational
ease since the representative manager’s problem is only defined when his wealth is strictly positive. Since this is an
open interval it is computationally difficult to deal with. I found that varying lmz within [0.0025,0.0075] did not
substantially change the statistics reported in Table 3-1.
26As discussed in footnote 22, it seems natural to concentrate on market value and calibrate the model to wealth
dynamics.
27From a modeling perspective, endowments can be interpreted as labor income by augmenting the production
function to achieve the desired wage rate, labor demand, and labor supply; this is excluded for the sake of brevity.
Endogenizing labor should not affect the basic results on capital structure which are driven by the distribution of
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The preference parameters β and α are chosen to be standard at 0.95 and 2.5 respectively. To
ensure no class of managers accumulates wealth to the point where agency problems do not bind
x1 = x2 = 0.87.28
3 Simulation
3.1 Simulation results
This section reports the results of a Monte Carlo simulation for the economy with the parameters
described in Section 2.2.2. The equilibrium is solved numerically using a modified version of the
“auctioneer algorithm” developed in Lucas (1994).29
Managers face technology dynamics described by the Markov chain in Table 2-1. Table 3-1
presents key endogenous variables conditioned on the realized aggregate state. These statistics are
computed under the assumption that initially each manager has 7.5% of the wealth. The economy
evolves for 5,000 years, driven by realizations of the exogenous technology process. The reported
statistics are based on averages for years 5,001 to 25,000.
Aside from leverage (bt,z
it,z
), a number of summary statistics are reported across the aggregate
state. Although expected returns on the underlying technologies do not change over time, ex-
pected market returns on unlevered equity (E[rt+1,z|ωaggregate,t] = E[ωt+1,z |ωaggregate,t]pt,z − 1) and risk
free debt (rft+1) vary with the severity of agency problems and are reported. Equity premia
(E[rezt+1−r
f
t+1|ωaggregate,t] = E[ωt+1,zit,z−bt,z |ωaggregate,t]pt,zit,z−pbtbt,z −(1+r
f
t+1)), investment growth (
it,1+it,2
it−1,1+it−1,2
−1),
wealth across the economy.
28The solution technique maps current relative wealth of each manager class (wt,1yt ,
wt,2
yt
) to the next period
(wt+1,1yt+1 ,
wt+1,2
yt+1
). The technique only works when the space of relative wealth gets mapped onto itself; managers
cannot get too rich or too poor. In general, there is a range for x1 and x2 that will work.
29Modifications as well as approximation errors are discussed in Appendix 2.
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expected future growth (E[yt+2
yt+1
|ωaggregate,t]− 1) and the change in debt and equity as a fraction of
the economy (E[ bt,z−bt−1,z
yt−1
|ωaggregate,t] − 1 and E[ (pt,zit,z−p
b
tbt,z)−(pt−1,zit−1,z−pbt−1bt−1,z)
yt−1
|ωaggregate,t] −1)
are reported and related to leverage and the severity of agency problems.
The intuition from the two period economy follows in this infinite horizon setting. In any period,
a low realization of production results in a relative wealth shift away from that class of managers
due to their levered positions. Since periods are linked by the relative wealth of each agent, class 1
(low agency cost) firms have counter-cyclical leverage, whereas class 2 (high agency cost) firms do
not; class 2 firms are up against their borrowing constraint. Expected market returns on unlevered
equity and risk free debt, are pro-cyclical despite the constant expected return on technology;
E[ω1] = 1.1065 and E[ω2] = 1.1360. The difference between E[rt+1,z|ωaggregate,t] and E[ωz] is a
measure of the rents appropriated by managers as a result of the agency problems. Despite higher
technology returns, class 2 market returns are not uniformly higher due to the severity of their
agency problems. The inefficiency in investment is evident by the relative investment of class 1
firms across the aggregate state, i1
i1+i2
, that is counter-cyclical. It is not surprising that contractions
reduce i2 by more than i1; firms that face more severe restrictions on capital structure choice cannot
invest optimally. The counter-cyclical equity premium for class 1 firms is due to counter-cyclical
leverage as well as the risk premium households require for holding a less diversified portfolio in
contractions; the unlevered equity premium is counter-cyclical for class 1 firms. The pro-cyclical
equity premium for class 2 firms is in part due to their flat leverage over the cycle as well as
the diversification premium households pay in contractions; the unlevered equity premium is pro-
cyclical for class 2 firms. The expected growth in the economy one period after the aggregate
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state is realized is approximately 0.12% lower when the economy realizes the low aggregate state,
indicating the endogenous persistence of bad outcome realizations. The change in equity financing is
pro-cyclical for both classes of firms and the change in debt is counter-cyclical for class 1 firms. The
pro-cyclical change in debt for class 2 firms is due to flat leverage coupled pro-cyclical investment;
the decrease in investment during contractions force debt to decrease due to the binding borrowing
constraint. Finally, the standard deviation of investment growth is 4.7%.
Table 3− 1 : endogenous variables from
simulations when managers are heterogeneous (percent)
Expansions Contractions
leverage1 (
b1
i1
) 21.56 24.65
leverage2 (
b2
i2
) 20.00 20.00
unlevered equity1 (r1) 10.17 9.81
unlevered equity2 (r2) 10.38 9.38
risk free rate (rf ) 8.91 8.31
equity premium1 0.96 2.03
equity premium2 1.78 1.30
investment growth1 4.66 −1.11
investment growth2 9.10 −4.41
i1
i1+i2
55.34 57.07
yt+1 growth 1.62 1.50
change in equity1 0.90 −0.43
change in debt1 −0.12 0.22
change in equity2 0.95 −056
change in debt2 0.22 −0.11
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3.2 Discussion and interpretation
For reasonable parameter values, I have demonstrated that the model can achieve capital structure
dynamics similar to those observed in the data. Class 1 (low agency cost) firms have counter-cyclical
leverage ratios, but class 2 (high agency cost) firms do not. This is consistent with Korajczyk and
Levy (2000) who find that after correcting for variations in firm characteristics, target leverage
was approximately 2-3% higher for their classified unconstrained firms during the 1990/91 recession
when compared to the rest of their sample period. Results from the calibrated model also show
that the change in debt due to the variation in target leverage is counter-cyclical for class 1 firms,
but not for class 2 firms, and the change in equity is substantially pro-cyclical for both classes. This
is qualitatively consistent with Korajczyk and Levy (2000) who find that deviations from target
leverage account for a substantial portion of time-series variation in the security issue or repurchase
choice.30
The reduction in investment and future growth, and the model’s prediction that investment
growth is more volatile than the economy is qualitatively consistent with empirical results on aggre-
gate investment found in the macroeconomic literature (e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982). However,
the model does not differentiate between investment and the capital stock, so it is difficult to com-
pare magnitudes to any single series in the data. The inefficient shift away from class 2 investment
in contractions is consistent with BGG who present evidence that inventory investment growth for
small (or bank-dependent) firms is more susceptible to recessions associated with Federal Reserve
monetary tightening. This result is also consistent with the literature that relates cash flows (and
30Since the model does not differentiate between security issues, security repurchases or payout policies, the
magnitudes are difficult to compare to any single series in the data.
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access to capital markets) with investment (see the introduction).31
The calibration of γ1 is open to question since low agency cost firms can issue bonds with a
face value of at most 25% of investment. However, sensitivity analysis for γ (not reported in this
paper) indicate that relaxing this constraint increases average leverage and magnifies the variance
of leverage and issues across the aggregate state; the qualitative results on leverage or the change
in debt and equity remain unchanged.
Moreover, two assumptions on the space of contracts, the restriction on aggregate state and single
period contracts, are used for tractability and require justification. First, there is empirical evidence
and theoretical arguments that justify why manager compensation should be tied to aggregate risk
(see Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) or Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000)).32 Others have used
alternative modeling techniques in general equilibrium settings, such as aggregate constraints on
financial intermediaries, to achieve amplification and propagation of aggregate shocks while allowing
for aggregate state contingent securities (see for example Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998),
Krishnamurthy (2000), Rampini (1999) and Suarez and Sussman (1997)). In such settings, when
output is high, managers receive a higher level of wealth which reduces moral hazard problems and
allows for better risk sharing (lower leverage), maintaining the qualitative counter-cyclical nature
of leverage.
31The relative size of our two classes is similar to that cited in BGG. They estimate that 13 of manufacturing,
3
4 of
wholesale and retail, 89 of services and
9
10 of construction sales is done by small firms.
32Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) develop a model where strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of
relative performance-based incentives. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) argue that boards may want their CEOs
to respond to aggregate shocks for two reasons. First, in the context of the oil industry, the board may want the
CEO to “keep his eyes open” for an oil shock. Second, the “value” of a CEO’s human capital rises and falls with
industry fortunes. Since a CEO’s pay rises and falls with his outside wage, his pay will rise and fall with aggregate
shocks.
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Second, models that relate risk sharing with agency problems, in settings that allow for dynamic
contracts, generally find that agents (managers) receive a riskier compensation stream (hold riskier
positions in their firm) than they would with no agency problems (see Atkeson and Lucas (1992) or
Green (1987)). As above, in such a setting, when output is high, managers in my model receive a
higher share of wealth which reduces moral hazard problems and allows for better risk sharing (lower
leverage). In this sense the qualitative counter-cyclical nature of leverage is robust to expanding
the space of contracts or alternative agency problems.
4 Conclusion
This paper began by asking how the choice of financial instruments (capital structure) varies with
macroeconomic conditions in presence of agency problems, and how this choice relates to investment
decisions and future growth. I have provided a calibrated model of capital structure choice that
explains observed systematic financing patterns across firms. The model predicts a resulting inef-
ficient shift of investment away from high agency cost firms as well as lower aggregate investment
and expected growth in downturns.
There are several natural directions to extend this work. The model can be calibrated to help
explain some of the capital structure regularities across countries (see Rajan and Zingales (1998)
for example). It would be interesting to embed a more developed production technology that can
differentiate between changes in agency costs and the marginal product of investment, allowing for
more accurate inference. The model also has implications for how asset prices, managerial compen-
sation and managerial ownership of other firms vary predictably with macroeconomic conditions
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that has not been emphasized and could be explored.
Furthermore, the model can be extended to multiple periods. Adding more structure can incor-
porate price reactions to issue choices. Another extension can include a distinction between retained
earnings and capital markets as sources financing as well as a payout policy decision.
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1 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Truthful reporting and no liquidation follow from the following incentive constraint:
sj(ωij − b) ≥ max[sj(ωˆij − b) + ψ(ωij − ωˆij),ψωij − ψγij] ∀ω, ωˆ < ω
(A) Truthful reporting requires:
sj(ωij − bj) ≥ sj(ωˆij − bj) + ψ(ωij − ωˆij) ∀ω, ωˆ < ω
⇔ sj(ω − ωˆ) ≥ ψ(ω − ωˆ) ∀ω, ωˆ < ω
⇔ sj ≥ ψ
(B) When sj ≥ ψ, no liquidation requires:
sj(ωij − bj) ≥ ψωij − ψγij ∀ω
⇔ (s
j − ψ)ω + ψγ
sj
≥ b
j
ij
∀ω
since sj ≥ ψ
⇔ (s
j − ψ)ω + ψγ
sj
≥ b
j
ij
¥
Proof of Proposition 2:
I prove the proposition in 4 steps. Lemma 1 shows that a manager only liquidate if sj > ψ.
This allows us to rule out liquidation securities when sj ≤ ψ and prove that truth telling securities
strictly dominate securities with false reports in Lemma 2. Lemma 3 describes the set of ω where the
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manager liquidates. Finally, Lemma 4 proves that securities with no liquidation strictly dominate
securities with liquidation.
Lemma 1 A manager only liquidates if sj > ψ.
Proof. When sj = ψ, the manager always reports the truth by Proposition 1 (A). He liquidates
if his contractual payoff is lower than liquidation, ψ(ωij − b) < ψωij − ψγij , which reduces to
ψγij < bψ. Since this is independent of ω, the manager will always or never liquidate. If he always
liquidates, no outside funding can be obtained since no household would accept this security.
When sj < ψ, the manager’s payoff from reporting, sj(ωˆij−bj)+ψ(ωij−ωˆij) = (sj−ψ)ωˆij−sjb+
ψωij, is decreasing in ωˆ and he always reports min{ωˆ} = ω. Therefore, the manager liquidates if the
following incentive constraint holds: sj(ωij−bj)+ψ(ωij−ωij) < ψωij−ψγij ⇔ sj(ωij−bj)−ψωij <
−ψγij which is independent of ω. Once again, the manager will always or never liquidate.
Lemma 2 Truth telling securities dominate securities with false reports.
Proof. By Proposition 1 (A) consider a strategy with misreporting: ij , bj and sj < ψ. I show that
an alternative strategy ij , bj0 = (ψ−s
j)ωij
ψ +
sj
ψ b
j and sj0 = ψ provides the manager with the same
payoffs, but allows him to raise strictly more capital for the given level of investment.
Under the original strategy sj < ψ and there is no liquidation by Lemma 1. Therefore, the
manager’s payoff, sj(ωˆij − bj) + ψ(ωij − ωˆij) = (sj − ψ)ωˆij − sjb+ ψωij, is decreasing in ωˆ and he
always reports min{ωˆ} = ω. As a result, his payoff is sj(ωij−bj)+ψ(ωij−ωij) and the household’s
payoff is (1− sj)(ωij − bj) + bj .
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Under the alternative strategy, there is no liquidation since bj0 = (ψ−s
j)ωij
ψ +
sj
ψ b
j ≤ (ψ−sj)ωijψ +
sj
ψ
(sj−ψ)ω+ψγ
sj
ij = γij, where the inequality follows from no liquidation in the original strategy:
bj ≤ (s
j−ψ)ω+ψγ
sj
ij ∀ω. The manager’s payoff in each state, ψ(ωij − bj0) is the same as the original
strategy:
ψ(ωij − bj0) = ψ(ωij − (ψ − s
j)ωij + sjb
ψ ) = ψωi
j − (ψ− sj)ωij − sjbj = sj(ωij − bj) +ψ(ωij − ωij)
Moreover, the household’s payoff, (1−ψ)(ωij−bj0)+bj0 is weakly higher in all states, and strictly
higher in some states, when compared to the original strategy:
(1− ψ)(ωij − bj0) + bj0
= (1− ψ)ωij + (ψ − sj)ωij + sjbj
= for ω = ω
> for ω > ω
(1− ψ)ωij + (ψ − sj)ωij + sjbj
= (1− sj)(ωij − bj) + bj
implying the manager can raise strictly more capital for the given level of investment.
Lemma 3 If sj > ψ and the manager liquidates in state ωˇ, then the manager liquidate in states
ω < ωˇ.
Proof. Since sj > ψ, the manager reports truthfully by Proposition 1 (A). Therefore, if the manager
liquidates in state ωˇ, it must be that his contractual payoff is less than liquidation: s(ωˇij − bj) <
ψωˇij − ψγij . Since sj > ψ it must be the case that sj(ωij − bj) < ψωij − ψγij for ω < ωˇ.
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Lemma 4 Securities with no liquidation strictly dominate securities with liquidation.
Proof. I consider a liquidation strategy, and show an alternative no liquidation strategy that
provides the manager a weakly higher payoff in all states, strictly higher in some states, and allows
him to raise at least as much capital for the given level of investment. By Lemma 1 attention can
be restricted to the case where sj > ψ. Consider liquidation strategy sj , bj and ij , and denote ωˇ > ω
to be the minimum state the manager does not liquidate. The manager’s payoff is:
sj(ωij − bj) for ω ≥ ωˇ
ψωij − ψγij for ω < ωˇ
Furthermore, the amount raised under this strategy is
R ω
ωˇ {(1− sj)(ωij − bj) + bj} pˆω∂ω where
Lemma 3 is used to price securities that only pay in states ω ≥ ωˇ.
Consider the alternative no liquidation strategy ij , sj0 and bj0 which is defined to solve:
sj0(ωij − bj0) = sj(ωij − bj)
bj0 =
(sj0 − ψ)ω + ψγ
sj0
ij
Under the alternative strategy, the manager’s payoff is the same as in the original strategy in state
ω, by the definition of sj0(ωij−bj0), and in state ω, since sj0(ωij−bj0) = (sj0ω− (sj0−ψ)ω−ψγ)ij =
(ψω − ψγ)ij. Moreover, his payoff in intermediate states, ω > ω > ω, is strictly higher than
the original strategy. This follows since the alternative payoff is a linear combination of the two
extreme points of the original convex payoff (recall the slopes, sj and ψ, of the original payoff
form a kink at ωˇ). It follows that sj0 > ψ and sj0 < sj. Since sj0 and bj0
ij
satisfy the conditions
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of Proposition 1 (B), there is no liquidation. The amount raised under the alternative strategy isR ω
ω {(1− sj0)(ωij − bj0) + bj0} pˆω∂ω.
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show the manager raises at least as much capital, for
the given level of investment, under the alternative strategy:Z ω
ωˇ
©
(1− sj)(ωij − bj) + bj
ª
pˆω∂ω ≤
Z ω
ω
©
(1− sj0)(ωij − bj0) + bj0
ª
pˆω∂ω
⇔
Z ω
ωˇ
©
(1− s)ωij + sbj
ª
pˆω∂ω ≤
Z ω
ω
©
(1− sj0)ωij + sj0bj0
ª
pˆω∂ω
since there is no liquidation with the original strategy in state ωˇ, it must be true that ψωˇij−ψγij ≤
sj(ωˇij − bj) ⇔ bj ≤ (s
j−ψ)ωˇ+ψγ
sj
ij . Moreover, since bj0 = (s
j0−ψ)ω+ψγ
sj0 i
j it is sufficient to replace both
bj and bj0 and show:Z ω
ωˇ
©
(1− sj)ωij + (sj − ψ)ωˇij + ψγij
ª
pˆω∂ω ≤
Z ω
ω
©
(1− sj0)ωij + (sj0 − ψ)ωij + ψγij)
ª
pˆω∂ω
since ωˇ > ω Z ω
ωˇ
©
(1− sj)ω + (sj − ψ)ωˇ
ª
pˆω∂ω ≤
Z ω
ω
©
(1− sj0)ω + (sj0 − ψ)ω)
ª
pˆω∂ω
⇔
Z ω
ωˇ
©
sj(ωˇ − ω) + ω − ψωˇ
ª
pˆω∂ω ≤
Z ω
ω
©
sj0(ω − ω) + ω − ψω
ª
pˆω∂ω
since sj > sj0 and ω ≤ ω it is sufficient to replace sj0 with sj on the right hand side and show:
⇔
Z ω
ωˇ
©
sj(ωˇ − ω) + ω − ψωˇ
ª
pˆω∂ω ≤
Z ω
ω
©
sj(ω − ω) + ω − ψω
ª
pˆω∂ω
since the inequality is linear in sj , it is sufficient to consider max[sj]; the condition is trivially
satisfied at sj = ψ since ω < ωˇ. By Assumption 2, max[sj] = 1:
ωˇ
R ω
ωˇ pˆω∂ω
ω
R ω
ω pˆω∂ω
≤ 1
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Since ωˇ
R ω
ωˇ pˆω∂ω
ω
R ω
ω pˆω∂ω
|ωˇ=ω= 1, it is sufficient to show that at each point ωˇ ∈ (ω,ω], ∂∂ωˇ ωˇ
R ω
ωˇ pˆω∂ω ≤ 0 :
∂
∂ωˇ ωˇ
R ω
ωˇ pˆω∂ω =
R ω
ωˇ pˆω∂ω − ωˇpˆωˇ ≤ 0 which is true by condition (i).
When ∂pˆω∂ω ≤ 0,
R ω
ωˇ pˆω∂ω − ωˇpˆωˇ < pˆωˇ
R ω
ωˇ ∂ω − ωˇpˆωˇ = pˆωˇ(ω − 2ωˇ) ≤ 0 which is true by condition
(ii). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3:
By Propositions 1 and 2 it is sufficient to consider securities where sj ≥ ψ and sj(ωij − bj) ≥
ψωij − ψγij. This proposition shows the truth telling constraint binds, sj = ψ. The manager’s
maximization problem is:
max
ij ,bj ,sj
Um(c
j
0, c
j
1)
s.t. cj0 ≤ wm0 − (ij − (1− sj)(pij − pbbj)− pbbj)
cj1 ≤ sj(ωij − bj)
sj ≥ ψ
sj(ωij − b) ≥ ψωij − ψγij
Recognizing that by nonsatiation the first two constraints hold with equality, the following La-
grangian follows (suppressing the notation for cj0 and c
j
1):
max
ij ,bj ,sj ,µ1,µ2
Υ = (c
j
0)
1−α
1− α + xβE
(cj1)
1−α
1− α − µ1(ψ − s
j)− µ2(ψωij − ψγij − sj(ωij − bj)).
Necessary conditions imply the following FOCs
∂Υ
∂ij = −(1− p(1− s
j))(cj0)
−α + xβE[sjω(cj1)−α]− µ2(ψω − ψγ − sjω) = 0 (28)
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and
∂Υ
∂bj = p
bsj(cj0)
−α − xβE[sj(cj1)−α] + µ2sj = 0 (29)
Case 1: sj(ωij − bj) > ψωij − ψγij ⇒ µ2 = 0 and the following necessary FOC
∂Υ
∂sj = −(pi
j − pbbj)(cj0)−α + xβE[(ωij − bj)(c
j
1)
−α] + µ1 = 0
= −(pij − pbbj)(cj0)−α + xβE[ω(c
j
1)
−α]ij − βE[(cj1)−α]bj + µ1
using equations (28) and (29)
= −(pij − pbbj)(cj0)−α + ij
(1− (1− sj)p)
sj
(cj0)
−α − pbbj(cj0)−α + µ1
=
½
−(pij − pbbj) + ij 1− p+ s
jp
sj
− pbbj
¾
(cj0)
−α + µ1
= ij
1− p
sj
(cj0)
−α + µ1
⇔ µ1 = ij
p− 1
sj
(cj0)
−α
⇒ µ1 > 0 when p > 1
furthermore, the condition µ1(ψ − sj) = 0⇒ ψ = sj.
Case 2: When sj(ωij − bj) = ψωij − ψγij the necessary FOC implies
∂Υ
∂sj = −(pi
j − pbbj)(cj0)−α + xβE[(ωij − bj)(c
j
1)
−α] + µ1 + µ2(ωij − bj) = 0
= −(pij − pbbj)(cj0)−α + xβE[ω(c
j
1)
−α]ij − xβE[(cj1)−α]bj + µ1 + µ2(ωij − bj)
using equations (28) and (29),
= −(pij − pbbj)(cj0)−α +
½
(1− (1− sj)p)
sj
(cj0)
−α + µ2
(ψω − ψγ − sjω)
sj
¾
ij − (pb(cj0)−α + µ2)bj
+µ1 + µ2(ωij − bj)
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=
½
−(pij − pbbj) + ij 1− p+ s
jp
sj
− pbbj
¾
(cj0)
−α + µ1 + µ2(i
j (ψω − ψγ − sjω)
sj
− bj + ωij − bj)
= ij
1− p
sj
(cj0)
−α + µ1 + µ2(i
jψω − ψγ
sj
− 2bj)
⇔ µ1 = ij
p− 1
sj
(cj0)
−α − µ2ij(
ψω − ψγ
sj
+ 2
(ψ − sj)ω − ψγ
sj
)
= ij
p− 1
sj
(cj0)
−α − µ2
ij
sj
(3ψω − 2sjω − 3ψγ)
≥ ij p− 1
sj
(cj0)
−α since ψ ≤ sj , µ2 ≥ 0 and ω ≤ 3γ
⇒ µ1 > 0 when p > 1
furthermore, the condition µ1(ψ − sj) = 0⇒ ψ = sj.¥
2 Appendix
This appendix describes the procedure used to calibrate the Markov chain. Annual firm level
COMPUSTAT data from 1974 to 1997 is used. Firms from the financial, insurance and real estate
sector (SIC codes in the 6000s) are precluded. Firms are required to have all data items except for
data on convertible and preferred securities, share repurchases and share issues for the entire sample
period. The resulting data set contains 899 firms from which 267 are deleted due to extreme values.33
As discussed in the text, two different calibration cases for the Markov chain are considered. In all
cases equation (27) is estimated for each firm where Book Value of Assetst−1 and Market Value of
Firmt+Intrstt+Divt are defined using the following data:
33I require each firm to have (i) Book Value of Assets>0 for all periods, (ii) the Market Value of Firm must be
greater than the Book Value of Assets for at least one period, and (iii) the Debt-to-Equity ratio over the period must
be less than 4.
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Data Definitions34
Equityt=shares outstandingt × Price per sharet
Divt=amount of dividends paidt
Debtt=book value of long term and short term debtt
Interestt=interest expenset
Issuet=value of shares issuedt
NPPEt−1=book value of property plant and equipmentt−1
PPEt−1=market value of property plant and equipmentt−1
Conv&Preft=value of convertible and preferred stockt
Rept=value of shares repurchasedt
Book Value of Assetst−1=book value of assetst−1-NPPEt−1+PPEt−1
Market Value of Firmt=Equityt+Debtt+Conv&Preft+Intrstt+Divt+Rept-Issuet
Dynamics of the production technology for the two classes of managers, ωz,t, match those of
the median estimates of equation (27) for firms that pay high and low dividends (Table A2-1) and
the simulated economy exhibits approximately the same standard deviation for the equity market
observed in the data (Heaton and Lucas(1996) Table 3 cites 17.3%). A firm is classified as paying
high dividends if it’s average dividend-to-income ratio over the sample period is in the top two
thirds of the sample.35
Table A2− 1
Sample medians [means] and (cross sectional standard errors)
High dividend payout firms Low dividend payout firms
µ 0.0547 [0.0755] (0.3517) 0.0547 [0.1090] (0.3400)
σ 0.3073 [0.3271] (0.1433) 0.3843 [0.4182] (0.1882)
The aggregate standard deviation and individual dynamics are matched by placing the following
restrictions:
1. ωz,t = ωaggregate,t × ωidiosyncratic z,t
2. ωz,t must match the idiosyncratic dynamics of Table A2-2
34Market value of property plant and equipment is estimated using procedures developed in Salanger and Summers
(1983) where capital expenditures are made at the beginning of a period. Following this logic, book value of assets
are measured at the beginning of the period.
35Alternative classifications such as the $250 million assets (measured in 1991) cutoff used in BGG yield very
similar results.
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3. the standard deviation of aggregate equity returns approximately matches the data
4. investment across the classes of firms is assumed to be the same
(only the stochastic portion of output can be calibrated)
5. ωidiosyncratic 1,t is perfectly negatively correlated with ωidiosyncratic 2,t
6. ωaggregate,t and ωidiosyncratic z,t are independent and can each take on values ±$agg and ±$z
These restrictions imply the following three equations with three unknowns ($agg, $1 and $2):
σ21 =
1
4
{($agg −$1)2 + ($agg +$1)2 + (−$agg −$1)2 + (−$agg +$1)2}
σ22 =
1
4
{($agg +$2)2 + ($agg −$2)2 + (−$agg +$2)2 + (−$agg −$2)2}
σ2aggregate =
1
4
{($agg + $2 −$1
2
)2 + ($agg +
$2 −$1
2
)2 +
(−$agg +
$2 −$1
2
)2 + (−$agg +
$2 −$1
2
)2}
The restrictions imply $agg = 0.12, $1 = 0.283, $2 = 0.365 and the Markov chain described
in Table A2-2 with a transition probability matrix that is equally weighted and independent across
states.
Table A2− 2
Markov chain
State Number
1
2
3
4
ω1 ω2
exp(µ+$agg +$1) = 1.580 exp(µ+$agg −$2) = 0.827
exp(µ+$agg −$1) = 0.897 exp(µ+$agg +$2) = 1.716
exp(µ−$agg +$1) = 1.243 exp(µ−$agg −$2) = 0.651
exp(µ−$agg −$1) = 0.706 exp(µ−$agg +$2) = 1.350
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2.1 Equilibrium Accuracy
Model equilibria in both the two period and infinite horizon setting are computed using a version of
the “auctioneer” algorithm of Lucas (1994) and is similar to that found in Heaton and Lucas (1996).
This algorithm searches for investment(s), stock holdings and bond holdings between all agents that
clears markets in every state of the world and implies agreement on the price of investment(s) and
bonds.
In the two period setting, the Euler equations of the unconstrained agents define prices of
investment and bonds as functions of the exogenous and endogenous variables. A fixed point to the
equations is found by iterating until the difference in solution for each asset price is less than 10−10.
In the infinite horizon setting, for a given level of investment and allocation of securities, the
Euler equations of the unconstrained agents define functional equations in the prices of investment
and bonds as functions of the exogenous and endogenous state variables (the distribution of wealth
across managers). These equations are estimated over a grid of 30 equally spaced points for managers
of class 1’s wealth and managers of class 2’s wealth (both for the range 0.003 to 0.15). The resulting
discrete state space is 30× 30× 4 since the exogenous state variables take on 4 different values. A
fixed point to the equations is found by iterating until there is less than a 0.05 percent difference in
the (uniformly weighted) average asset price solution across the grid space. Owing to the discrete
approximation, it is not possible to set the prices quoted by the three agents exactly equal to one
another.
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